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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL, ) 
Petitioner/Appellee, ] 
vs. ) 
RUTH M. LUNDAHL, ; 
Respondent/Appellant. ] 
) CASE NO. 20030800 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant ("Marlene") filed two opening briefs, one on December 1,2003 and another 
on February 6, 2004. The cover of the first opening brief is gray, only allowed for an 
appellant reply brief, in violation of Rule 27(d), Utah Rules Appellant Procedure 
(MU.R.App.P.ff) It appears that throughout this appeal, Marlene has ignored the rules of 
appellant procedure. Rule 24, U.R. App.P., implies that Marlene is allowed only one opening 
brief. Consequently, her December 1, 2003 brief and all supplements thereto should be 
rejected by this Court. This appellee brief shall only deal with the appellant opening brief 
filed February 6, 2004. Since this brief is also not in compliance with the applicable rules 
of appellant procedure, specifically the totality of Rules 24(a), including all subparts, the 
Order of the trial court should be affirmed and Marlene's brief should be rejected.1 This 
lSee State v. Lucero, 2002 UT APP 135,47 P.2d 107, 109 [Because defendant failed 
to make a statement of the issues presented for review with citations to the record, failed to 
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Court has the power to sua sponte reject Marlene's brief for her failure to comply with this 
rule. Additionally, appellee ("Gerald") is filing a motion to have this Honorable Court reject 
appellant's brief and affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, out of an abundance 
of caution and in light of the forthcoming motion to reject Marlene's opening brief, Gerald's 
is filing his brief in accordance with the briefing schedule and order enlarging the time for 
the filing of this brief. 
Additionally, Marlene's brief, as it is, fails to comply with Rule 24(a)(8) and (9). This 
non-compliance made it extremely difficult for Gerald to respond to the points Marlene 
attempted to make. For example, Marlene lacks adequate cites to the record as required by 
Rule 24(a)(9). She makes blanket statements without any support such as "the Plaintiff 
acquiesced to Utah Jurisdiction by submitting a complaint along with the registration in Utah 
of the California 1977 Dissolution Order . . . ." She cites no part of the record or any 
authority for this statement. Consequently, Gerald will submit a brief based upon what he 
submitted in the trial court to demonstrate that the Fourth District Court lacked the subject 
matter jurisdiction to modify the 1977 California Dissolution Order, that the decision of the 
trial court to grant his Motion to Strike was correct and should be affirmed by this Court. 
set forth the proper standard of review, and failed to include any relevant citations, authority, 
or "meaningful analysis that would support his allegations that the evidence was 
insufficient", the court determined that his briefing was inadequate and affirmed the trial 
court decision.]; and Randle v. Randle, 2002 UT APP 197 [The appellant was appearing pro 
se and failed to comply with Rule 24 - the standard of appellant review and made no 
citations to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court, the Court of 
Appeals rejected his brief and affirmed the decision of the trial court.] 
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JURISDICTION 
The February 6, 2004 opening brief of appellant ("brief) fails to provide any 
statements showing the jurisdiction of the appellant court as required by Rule 24(a)(4), 
U.R. App.P. Accordingly, her brief should be rejected and the lower court decision affirmed. 
Ruth M. Lundahl appeals from an order of the Fourth District Court determining that the 
Fourth District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the California Decree of 
Divorce involving the parties. Hence, all orders of the Fourth District Court purporting to 
modify the California Decree as to spousal support are void for lack of jurisdiction. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and (j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted appellee's Motion to Strike 
Respondent's Order to Show Cause upon the grounds that the court lacked the subject matter 
juiisdiction to enforce the April 13, 1995 Order entered by Judge Guy Burningham 
purporting to modify the California Judgment concerning spousal support. 
Standard of Review: A determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 
App. 1992). This court accords no deference to the trial court's determination but reviews it 
for correctness. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 
App. 1993). If a court lacks jurisdiction "it has not power to entertain the suit." Crump v. 
Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Fourth District Court lacked the 
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subject matter jurisdiction to enter its April 13,1995 Order purporting to modify the Superior 
Court of the State of California, the County of Los Angeles, Judgment Determining Property 
and Support Issue [sic] ("Judgment") in the case of Lundahl v. Lundahl, Case No. SE D 
36650, on the 14th day of September, 1977; therefore, the Fourth District Court April 13, 
1995 order is void and unenforceable. 
Standard of Review: A determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 
App. 1992). This court accords no deference to the trial court's determination but reviews it 
for correctness. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
3. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Superior Court of the State of 
California, the County of Los Angeles, the issuing court that entered the Judgment on the 14th 
day of September, 1997, had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the parties and the 
subject matter of spousal support. 
Standard of Review: A determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 
App. 1992). This court accords no deference to the trial court's determination but reviews it 
for correctness. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
4. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act ("UIFSA") applied retroactively to this case. 
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Standard of Review: Trial court may exercise broad discretion in adjusting the 
financial interests of the parties, so long as the decision is within the confines of legal 
precedence. Crocket v. Crocket, 836 P.2d 818, 819-820 (Utah App.1992). Where a trial 
court may exercise broad discretion, the court of appeals presume the correctness of the 
court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of. . . 
discretion.' Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App.1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22a-l, et. seq. and 78-45f-100, et seq. 
STATEMENT TO THE CASE 
On September 14, 1977, the parties were divorced pursuant to a California divorce 
decree. (R. 10-23) The California court, in the decree, specifically retained jurisdiction over 
the parties and subject matter of the decree. (R. 24) At the time, both parties resided in 
California. (R. 14, 20-21) Shortly thereafter, appellant moved to Utah, taking the parties' 
minor children with her. (R. 2) Throughout this protracted litigation, Gerald has always been 
a resident of California, he has never resided in Utah. (R. 599) When appellant interfered 
with appellee's visitation, he brought the California decree to Utah and had it domesticated 
pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act solely for the purpose of enforcing its provisions 
against Marlene. (R. 2-6, 28) Subsequently, Marlene attempted to have the California 
decree modified, even though appellee brought domesticated it in Utah solely for 
enforcement puiposes. (R. 29-31) Never once in any of her Fourth District Court petitions 
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to modify the California decree did Marlene cite any references to URESA, RURESA, or 
USIFSA as authority for her petitions to modify. All she mentioned were substantial and 
material changes of circumstances. In these petitions, she did not allege anything such as 
lack of due process or subject matter jurisdiction that would be considered a defense to the 
enforcement of the Judgment (R. 30-31, 198-201, 577-580). 
Upon the advice of counsel, Gerald stipulated to have the California decree modified 
by the Fourth District Court. (R. 62) Subsequently, at least three orders were issued by the 
Utah court purporting to modify the spousal support award in the California decree. (R. 126-
127 [1983 order], 221-223 [April 24, 1991 order], R. 473-476 [April 13, 1995 order]) These 
orders substantially modified the amount of support decreed by the California court. 
At the same time, Marlene submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the originating 
decree state - California Superior Court in various attempts to modify spousal support during 
the same or similar periods she was doing the same in the Fourth District Court of the State 
of Utah. The California Superior Court entered several orders modifying Gerald's spousal 
support and custody of the minor children. (R. 209-214,305-310,715-720 [August 24,1987 
order], 547-548 [November 16, 1994], 721-722 [March 3, 1989], and 723-724 [May 5, 
1993]. With the entry of the May 5, 1993 California Order, Marlene lost custody of her last 
and youngest child to Gerald. (R 723-724, 11) Consequently, California became the home 
state for the child custody aspect of the originating decree. 
Finally, on May 28, 2002 (R. 589), Marlene filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause 
and on May 29,2002, an Order to Show Cause was issued (R. 589), commanding Gerald to 
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appear and show cause regarding his contempt. In response, Gerald filed a Motion to Strike 
Marlene's Order to Show Cause (R. 640-641) and memorandum (R. 644-677) arguing that 
the Fourth District Court did not have the jurisdiction to modify a California Support Decree 
when Gerald continued to reside in California since the entry of the decree and only initially 
brought the California decree to Utah for enforcement purposes only. 
On May 29, 2003 (R. 789, 712), the trial court heard arguments on Gerald's Motion 
to Strike and Marlene's Order to Show Cause. At the conclusion of the arguments, the trial 
court asked for additional briefing. Consequently, on June 11, 2003 (R. 715-739), Gerald 
filed a Supplemental Brief. On June 13, 2003, two days after the deadline for filing 
supplemental briefs, Marlene filed one. (R. 740-758) On July 21, 2003, the trial court 
issued its Ruling granting Gerald's Motion to Strike, in essence ruling that the Fourth District 
Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to modify or amend the California decree. (R. 
781-789) On September 22, 2004, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
ofLaw, and Order in conformity with its decision. (R. 1037-1045) On September 28, 2003, 
Marlene filed a Notice of Appeal, which did not comply with Rule 3(d), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. (R. 1048-1101) (Gerald is filing a Motion to Strike this Notice for its 
non-compliance.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. A Judgment Determining Property and Support Issue [sic] ("Judgment") in the 
case of Lundahl v. Lundahl was issued in the Superior Court of the State of California for 
the County of Los Angeles, Case No. SE D 36650, on the 14th day of September, 1977. (R. 
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10-23) The California Superior Court ("Decree State") specifically retained jurisdiction over 
the parties and subject matter. (R. 24) 
2. Paragraph 6 of the Judgment deals with Spousal Support. Marlene was granted 
$600 per month in alimony. (R. 13) At the end of the paragraph, the Court "retains 
jurisdiction to reduce or increase said support as needs occur". (R. 24) 
3. At the time of the issuance of the Judgement, Appellee ("Gerald") and 
Appellant ("Marlene") resided in California. (R. 14, 20-21) 
4. Shortly after the issuance of the Judgment, Marlene moved with the children 
to Utah. (R. 2) 
5. Throughout this veiy protracted litigation, Gerald has always been a resident 
of California. He did not reside in Utah. (R. 599) 
6. After moving to Utah, Marlene interfered with Gerald's visitation. 
Consequently, he domesticated the Judgment in Utah pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act to enforce the Judgment. (R. 2-6, 28) 
7. Even though Gerald brought the Judgment to Utah for enforcement purposes 
only, Marlene attempted to modify the California Judgment in a Utah court. (R. 29-31.) Her 
first attempt at such occurred June 23, 1978. (R. 29-31.) Her second attempt to modify the 
Judgment occurred on January 3, 1991. (R. 198-201.) In any petition to modify filed in the 
Fourth District Court, Marlene never alleged URES A, RURES A, or USIFS A as authority for 
the modification. The modification attempts were based solely upon substantial and material 
changes of circumstance. (R. 30-31, 198-201, 577-580.) More importantly, the record is 
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devoid of Marlene claiming that the Judgment was obtained by fraud or lack of jurisdiction 
or lack of due process in the rendering state. Such allegations appear nowhere in her two 
petitions to modify the California Judgment. (R. 30-31, 198-201, 577-580.) 
8. Apparently, when Marlene did not get what she wanted from the Fourth 
District Court, she expressed her total disdain for the court and showed no desire to comply 
with the order as is evident from her letter to Gerald. (R. 25-26.) 
9. After Gerald attempted to enforce the Judgment and upon the advice of 
counsel, on June 30, 1980, he (in addition to his counsel, Marlene, and Marlene's counsel) 
entered into a stipulation attempting to modify the Judgment in a Utah court. This attempt 
resulted in alimony being assessed Gerald in the amount of $1.00 per year. (R. 62.) 
10. Since the entry of the Judgment, the jurisdiction of the California Superior 
Court was not meritoriously challenged by Marlene. She personally appeared, and at one 
time was represented by several California attorneys. (R. 715-722) 
11. After Marlene moved to Utah, a "bi-state filing war" commenced, fought in 
California and Utah. Marlene submitted herself to California jurisdiction in this "filing war". 
(R. 728, 720-729) 
12. It appears that Marlene was judge and court-shopping, that when a court in one 
state ruled against her, she would go to the court in another state. Consequently, inconsistent 
judgments were obtained. (R. 725-729) 
13. At least three orders were issued by the Fourth District Court purporting to 
modify the spousal support award in the California decree. (R. 126-127 [1983 order], 221-
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223 [April 24, 1991 order], R. 473-476 [April 13, 1995 order].) These orders substantially 
modified the amount of support decreed by the California court. The first order did not 
affect alimony. (R. 126-127.) The second Fourth District Court modification order modified 
the $600 alimony award of the California Judgment, increasing "temporary family support 
for the support of the plaintiff and minor children of the parties . . . . " to $3,000 per month. 
(R. 221, 221-223.) The third order increased Gerald's alimony obligation to $2,235 per 
month. (R. 473-476.) None of these Utah modification orders even mentions the California 
courts, California jurisdiction, California orders in existence, or that Utah is specifically 
modifying the California support order(s). (R. 126-127 [1983 order], 221-223 [April 24, 
1991 order], R. 473-476 [April 13, 1995 order].) 
14. At the same time, Marlene submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the 
originating decree state - California Superior Court in various attempts to modify spousal 
support during the same or similar periods she was doing the same in the Fourth District 
Court of the State of Utah. The California Superior Court entered several orders modifying 
Gerald's spousal support and custody of the minor children. (R. 209-214,305-310,715-720 
[August24,1987 order], 547-548 [November 16,1994 order], 721-722 [March 3,1989], and 
723-724 [May 5, 1993]. The order of August 24, 1987 modified the alimony award in the 
Judgment to $1,000 per month. (R. 718.) The order of November 16, 1994 modified the 
alimony award to $500 per month. (R. 548.) During the time period of 1987 through 1994, 
the California Superior Court entered orders modifying Gerald's alimony obligation. The 
other two orders dealt with Marlene being dispossessed of custody of her two youngest 
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children. (R. 721-722, 723-724.) 
15. On November 5, 1992, in order to obtain an Order to Show Cause, Marlene 
is accused by Gerald of conspiring with the process server to have Gerald served at 55 East 
1230 North, Provo, Utah, as his residence. (R. 612) Since prior to the entry of the 
Judgment, Gerald has not resided in Utah. (R. 599.) The Order to Show Cause was heard 
without the presence of Gerald, all in violation of his 14th Amendment rights. (R. 599-613.) 
16. Evidently, on or about January 19, 1993, Marlene again mislead the Fourth 
District Court into believing that Gerald was residing at 415 Bearcat Drive, Salt Lake City, 
Utah in order to serve him with another Order to Show Cause. (R. 608.) According to 
Gerald, this false service and misrepresentation that he was a resident of Utah influenced the 
trial court's decision that it had continuing and concurrent jurisdiction because of his Utah 
address and residence. (R. 605.) 
17. The action brought by Gerald to enforce his rights of visitation occurred while 
the parties had minor children. (R. 2-4.) With the entry of the May 5, 1993 California 
Order, Marlene lost custody of her last and youngest child to Gerald. (R 723-724, 11) 
Consequently, California became the home state for the child custody (since Gerald was a 
continuing resident there) aspect of the originating decree. The California court, in its May 
5,1993 order specifically stated in ^  1: "The court finds that California has jurisdiction.,f (R. 
724.) This loss of Utah home state concerning child custody occurred prior to Judge Guy 
Burningham's April 13, 1995 Modification Order. (R. 473-476.) 
18. The Record is devoid of evidence that the parties entered into an express 
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written consent to divest California of its jurisdiction. This never occurred. California 
always has been and is the decree state with continuing jurisdiction. California has always 
retained continuing jurisdiction over the issue of alimony (as well as child support). (R. 724, 
723-724, 24, 10-24.) 
19. Respondent has always had rights and remedies in the California dissolution 
court. However, rather than avail herself of these California remedies, she has engaged in 
forum shopping in an attempt to find a sympathetic court and obtain a favorable result, 
something she did not receive in the latest modification action in California. (R. 724, 723-
724, 24, 10-24, 725-729, and the whole record.) 
20. During 1997, respondent filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeals 
challenging whether the California Superior Court had the jurisdiction to enter a reduction 
of spousal support order (spousal support was reduced to $500). The California Court of 
Appeals reaffirmed that the court issuing the decree of divorce and the dissolution judgment, 
"maintained jurisdiction over the parties and spousal support. Indeed, Ruth participated in 
spousal support hearings in California after the judgment was entered and prior to August 
1994." [Emphasis in the original.] The California Court of Appeals correctly referred to the 
filings of the parties in California and Utah as a "bi-state filing war". (R. 725-729.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted Gerald's Motion to Strike Marlenefs Order to Show 
Cause, finding that the Fourth District Court lacked the jurisdiction to modify the Judgment 
granting Marlene's petitions to modify the Judgment's spousal support award. In the 
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Judgment, the California Superior Court retained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter and, over the years, continued to exercise it. Throughout all of the proceedings in the 
Fourth District Court, Gerald always remained a resident of California. Under these 
circumstances, the Fourth District Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to modify the 
California Judgment when it was domesticated by Gerald in Utah for enforcement purposes 
only. If Marlene wished to modify the Judgment, she should have applied to the California 
court to do so. Rather, she judge and forum shopped. In Utah, a court may only modify a 
spousal support order issued by another state if the Utah court has "continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction over the spousal support order". Consequently, any spousal support modification 
orders entered by the Fourth District Court are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
cannot be enforced. 
Additionally, it appears Marlene failed to comply with Rule 3(d), 9(c), and 24(a), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As such, her brief should be stricken and the judgment 
of the trial court affirmed. She also attempted to unlawfully place documents into the record 
of the Fourth District Court after Judge Laycock's ruling was entered. These documents 
should also be stricken. This will be the subject of GerakTs Motion to Strike the Appellant 
Brief and Affirm the Trial Court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
GERALDS MOTION TO STRIKE MARLENES ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT HAD NO SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE 
-13-
CALIFORNIA JUDGMENT ON APRIL 13,1995 
As can be ascertained from Marlene's brief, she appears to be claiming that the trial 
court erred in granting Gerald's Motion to Strike her Order to Show Cause. However, Utah 
case law is contrary to that position. The trial court decision should be affirmed. In State 
of Utah Dept. of Human Services v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52; 975 P.2d 939, the Court of 
Appeals decided the very issue present in the instant case and is directly on point. The issue 
there concerned a Virginia spousal support order attempted to be modified by a Utah court. 
The Jacoby Court stated: 
In Utah, a court may only modify a spousal support order issued by 
another state if the Utah court has 'continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over 
the spousal support order. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-206(2). The method by 
which a Utah court obtains 'continuing exclusive jurisdiction' over a spouse 
support order is by 'issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state 
. . .' Id. § 78-45f-205(6). Thus, a Utah court cannot obtain 'continuing 
exclusive jurisdictionr unless it issues the spousal support order. In this case, 
a Virginia court issued the spousal support order and therefore, the order could 
not be modified by the court in Utah. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
decision on this issue. [Emphasis added.] 
In the instant case, California originally issued the spousal support order. (R. 10-23.) 
Accordingly, the Fourth District Court could not modify the California spousal support order 
as it attempted to do prior to September 22, 2003. (R. 1037-1045, 221-223, 473-476.) 
An analysis of § 78-45f-205 is clear that the Fourth District Court lacked the 
jurisdiction to hear the pending Order to Show Cause and lacked the jurisdiction to modify 
the California decree; consequently, the 1983 Order (R. 126-127), the April 24, 1991 Order 
(R. 221-223), and the April 13, 1995 Order (R. 473-476) are all void due to lack of subject 
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matter jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-205(6) states that "[a] tribunal of this state 
may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state having 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45f-206(3) states that "[a] tribunal of this state which lacks continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction over a spousal support order may not serve as a responding tribunal to modify 
a spousal support order of another state." 
In the Judgment, the California court made it clear that it retained jurisdiction over 
the parties and subject matter. (R. 24.) Subsequent California modification orders also 
stated that it had the jurisdiction to enter the order. (R. 724.) Additionally, Gerald has 
continually resided in California since the issuance of the Judgment. (R. 599.) 
Gerald initially brought the Judgment to Utah pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act solely to enforce it against Marlene. (R. 2-6, 28.) Thereafter, in the Fourth District 
Court, Marlene filed a petition to modify the Judgment. (R. 29-31.) Again, she did not 
assert any statutory authority to do so other than allege that a substantial and material change 
of circumstances had occurred.2 (R. 30-31, 198-201, 577-580.) One of the clearest Utah 
cases explaining the inability of a Utah court to modify a California decree when an action 
is initiated to enforce such is Bankler v. Bankler, (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 963 P.2d 797. In that 
case, a California decree which "specifically 'maintained jurisdiction over spousal support 
2As set forth in the statement of facts, on June 23, 1978 when she initially filed the 
petition to modify, Marlene did not allege URESA. (R. 29-31.) Ditto for her January 3, 
1991 second petition to modify. In fact, at that time, she did not allege that the modification 
action was being brought to RURESA. (R. 198-201.) 
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. . ."' (at p.798), was domesticated in Utah. Once domesticated, the husband sought to 
modify the same in the Utah court. The trial court "dismissed the petition to modify, holding 
it had 'no jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce arising in a sister state, and the matter 
is best handled in the sister state.'" (Id.). The husband asserted "that by domesticating the 
California decree and all subsequent orders entered by the California court, [wife] subjected 
herself and the case in its entirety, to the Utah court's jurisdiction." (Id.) The wife argued 
"that notwithstanding language in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Utah court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to modify a California divorce decree." She further argued "that 
Utah statutes confer exclusive continuing jurisdiction upon the original court" . . . and 
domesticating [same] does "not abrogate the California court's exclusive jurisdiction." Id. 
at pp.798-799. The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the wife. The Court of Appeal noted 
the Utah Supreme Court's discussion of the limited ability of Utah courts to address issues 
decided in a foreign judgment. Id. at p. 799. [Emphasis added.] 
The Bankler court declared that the Utah Supreme Court "held that neither Rule 60(b) 
nor our Utah Foreign Judgment Act allows our Utah courts to reopen, reexamine, or alter a 
foreign judgment duly filed in this state, absent a showing of fraud or the lack ofjurisdiction 
or the lack of due process in the rendering state." Since the husband did not assert "fraud or 
lack of jurisdiction or due process by the California court, as required by [our Supreme 
Court]", he could not seek to modify and the Utah court could not modify the California 
decree. Id. at p. 800. The record is devoid of Marlene claiming that the Judgment was 
obtained by fraud or lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process in the rendering state. 
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The Bankler Court continued: 
Actions to modify a divorce decree should 'properly be brought in the forum 
which issued the decree,' Angell v. Sixth Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 405, 406-07 
(Utah 1982) (per curium). In Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 
710,711 (Utah Ct.App. 1992), a wife petitioned the Third District Court in Salt 
Lake County for modification of a Fifth District Washington County divorce 
decree. On appeal, this court held that 'the court issuing the original decree 
retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify its decrees. Parties wishing to modify 
a decree must do so in the original forum. 
Although Rimensburger concerned subject matter jurisdiction of two 
Utah courts, other Utah cases have discussed the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction when the courts concerned are the courts of sister states. For 
example, in Oglesby v. Oglesby, 29 Utah 2d 419, 510 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1973), 
our supreme court addressed the question of whether a Washington state court 
could modify a Utah divorce decree. Although the Washington court had 
reduced the husband's support obligation, our supreme court held that the 
decree could not be considered properly 'modified' by the Washington court 
because the decree could only be 'changed by a duly constituted Utah court.' 
Id. 510 P.2d at 1107. The court noted that constitutional problems would 
arise if a 'responding state had the power to destroy the legitimate judgments 
of sister states! 
Similarly, in Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (1967), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a Utah court could modify a 
Nevada divorce decree. When the wife sued to enforce the judgment in Utah, the 
husband counterclaimed, asserting that he had undergone such a material change of 
circumstances that the decree should be modified to excuse him from making future 
alimony payments. Our supreme court held 'the lower court was correct in its holding 
that it had no power or authority to change or modify the Nevada judgment.' Id. at 
272, 430 P.2d 580. Therefore, Utah courts may not consider a petition to 
modify terms of a divorce decree entered by a foreign jurisdiction and 
domesticated in Utah for enforcement purposes. The fact that Ms. Bankler 
domesticated and filed all the California orders pertaining to the divorce does 
not change that conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act does not confer jurisdiction on a Utah court 
to prospectively modify an order issued by a foreign state court in a divorce 
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action, nor does it permit reopening a judgment absent allegations of fraud, 
lack of jurisdiction, or lack of due process. We therefore affirm the trial 
court's judgment." [Emphasis added.] 
M a t pp. 800-801. 
The Bankler court meticulously reviewed Utah Supreme Court cases and other 
authorities in concluding that Utah courts cannot modify an out -of-state decree such as was 
done in the instant case. In accord, Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 
App. 1992) ["The question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction 'goes to the very 
power of a court to entertain an action.'" The Rimensburger court also held that modification 
of a decree from the District Court of another county in Utah or from another state should 
"properly be brought in the forum which issued the decree .... To hold otherwise would do 
great mischief to orderly judicial process and would encourage forum shopping."] 
This forum shopping by Marlene and insistence that the Fourth District Court hear her 
petitions and/or orders to show cause to modify the California divorce decree have resulted 
in inconsistent judgments and have created judicial chaos, in addition to the damage done 
to Gerald, as a result of these inconsistent judgments. (R. 221, 221-223, 473-476.) For 
instance, in August, 1987, Gerald was ordered by the California court to pay $1,000 per 
month as alimony. (R. 718.) Then Fourth District Court Commissioner Maetani entered a 
temporary order obliging him to pay $3,000 spousal and child per month, "until this court 
hears the matter on its merits." (R. 221.) Subsequently, Gerald was then ordered on 
November 16, 1994 to pay alimony in an amount of $500 per month. (R. 548.) At this time, 
if Gerald did not pay $500 per month, he would have been in contempt of the California 
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court. If he did not pay $3,000 per month without any distinction as to what portion would 
be alimony, he would be in contempt of the Fourth District Court. 
If ever there were a case that made the Bankler statement that" constitutional problems 
would arise if a 'responding state had the power to destroy the legitimate judgments of sister 
states", this certainly is one. This madness should stop and this Court should affirm the 
decision of the trial court which granted Gerald's Motion to Strike the Order to Show Cause 
of Marlene. Marlene's first petition clearly demonstrates that the Utah Court never had the 
requisite subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Originating Court's Dissolution Decree. 
This case also demonstrates the prophetic insight of the Rimensburger court that held that 
modification of a decree from the District Court of another county in Utah or from another 
state should "properly be brought in the forum which issued the decree.... To hold otherwise 
would do great mischief to orderly judicial process and would encourage forum shopping." 
Additionally, Rimensburger, supra, is directly on point. The Fifth District Court in 
Washington County, Utah entered a decree of divorce in January, 1981. More than ten years 
later, the wife petitioned the Third District Court in Salt Lake County for modification. The 
Salt Lake County Court, over the objections of the husband, assumed jurisdiction of the 
modification action. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed this assumption of modification 
and held that the Third District Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
modification action. In so holding, it stated: 
Thus, the court issuing the original decree retains exclusive jurisdiction to 
modify its decrees. Parties wishing to modify a decree must do so in the 
original forum. See Angell v. Sixth District Court, 656 P.2d 405,406-07 (Utah 
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1982) (per curium) (actions to modify divorce decree should 'properly be 
brought in the forum which issued the decree'). A party can no more ask a 
different court to modify a divorce decree already entered that it can ask a 
different court for a new trial in a case otherwise concluded To hold 
otherwise would do great mischief to orderly judicial process and would 
encourage forum shopping. [Emphasis added.] 
M a t 710. 
This is exactly what Marlene has done in this case. She has (albeit successfully) 
asked the Fourth District Court to modify a California divorce decree (where the California 
court expressly retained jurisdiction) in order to do great mischief to orderly judicial process 
and has forum shopped to do so. This should stop here. "The question of whether a court 
has subject matter jurisdiction 'goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action.'" 
Rimensburger, at 710 (citing with approval Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah 
App. 1990). Since the Fourth District Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction, it lacks 
the power to entertain action below. Consequently, the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
A. The April 4, 1991, Temporary Order 
Rendered By Commissioner Maetani Is Also 
Void For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
For the same reasons set forth hereinabove, the April 4,1991 Temporaiy Order is void 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the order by its terms is only temporaiy. (R. 
221-223.) Second, this April 4, 1991 order, also by its terms, merged into the April 13, 
1995 order. This ordered ended with "until this court hears the matter on its merits." (R. 
221.) The only time the case was alleged heard on its merits was at the hearing from which 
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the April 13, 1995 came. (R. 473-476.) Additionally, the Commissioner is not a judge; yet, 
the Commissioner entered an order rather than a recommendation. Finally, the Temporary 
Order fails to specify what portion of the $3,000 is alimony and what portion is child 
support. (R. 221-223.) Since the entry of this Temporary Order is derivative of Gerald's 
initial attempt to domestic the Judgment, it should be rendered void for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. (R. 2-6, 28.) 
n. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
GERALD'S MOTION TO STRIKE BASED UPON THE 
FACT THAT CALIFORNIA HAS EXCLUSIVE, 
CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THIS ACTION 
In State of Utah, Dept. of Human Services v. Jacoby, supra, the Utah Court of 
Appeals made it perfectly clear that the originating state had exclusive and continuing 
jurisdiction over the decrees entered by it. This is especially so in this case where the 
California court issuing the Judgment expressly affirmed that it had continuing jurisdiction 
over the parties and the issue of spousal support. (R. 24.) Even assuming otherwise, another 
state cannot purport to dictate to this state whether Utah has subject matter jurisdiction. This 
determination is in the exclusive province of Utah. 
It is the Utah Court of Appeals desire to eliminate the erroneous assumption of 
concurrent jurisdiction. This is exactly the case here. We have judicial chaos as a result of 
Utah attempting to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with California. We have inconsistent 
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judgments. Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1176, 1177 (Utah Ct.App.1991).3 The 
continuing jurisdiction of the issuing court (California) is exclusive. Other states do not have 
jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must respect and defer to the prior state's continuing 
jurisdiction. "Although the new state becomes a child's home state,4 significant connection 
jurisdiction continues in the state of the prior decree where the court record and other 
evidence exists where one parent or another contestant continues to reside." Id. at 1177. 
The Crump court cited State in Interest ofD.SK., 792 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah App.1990), 
which held "[a]s long as the decree state retains jurisdiction there is no concurrent 
jurisdiction to modify a decree under the UCCJA." California undeniably retained 
continuing jurisdiction and exercised the same subsequent to rendering the Judgment. (R. 
24, 209-214, 305-310, 715-720 [August 24, 1987 order], 547-548 [November 16, 1994 
order], 721-722 [March 3, 1989], and 723-724 [May 5, 1993].) 
In 2000, the decision in State of Utah, in the interest of A.M. S. andA.S., person under 
2sCrump did an analysis under the PKPA and UCCJA. Under the PKPA analysis, Utah 
"must decline to exercise jurisdiction unless the court of the other State no longer has 
jurisdiction, or has declined to exercise such . . . ." In the instant case, California has 
continued to exercise jurisdiction over Gerald and Marlene and has entered orders modifying 
custody and support. 
Under the UCCJA analysis of this case, California also has exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction because it has continued to exercise such even when the Fourth District Court 
has also done so. "Only when the child and all parties have moved away is deference to 
another state's continuing jurisdiction no longer required." 
4At the time of the April 13, 1995 Order, California was the home state for Gerald 
since he, the year previous, had gained custody of the youngest child of the parties. No more 
minor children were present in Utah. (R. 721-722, 723-724.) According to Gerald, the 
children either ran away from home to avoid Marlene's abusive and intolerable conduct or 
moved to California to be with Gerald. (R. 301-304.) 
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eighteen years of age, K.P.S. v. State of Utah, 2000 UT App. 182,4 P.3d 95, 98, was issued. 
This case dealt directly with the state issuing the support decree of Judgment had exclusive, 
continuing jurisdiction over that support decree and Judgment: 
Under the UCCJA, because the Arizona court made the initial custody 
determination when all parties resided in Arizona and Father continues to so 
reside, a Utah court generally may not modify that determination. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1996); Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995) [stating that the decree state continues to have jurisdiction when 
Father continues to reside there and have visitation contact with children and 
fthe continuing jurisdiction of the court in which the decree originated is 
intended to remain exclusive']; Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991) [holding that jurisdiction did not shift to Utah from Montana 
when mother and children moved to there because Father remained in 
Montana); In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124 [The jurisdiction of state A continues 
and is exclusive as long as the husband lives in state A . . . .' (Citation 
omitted; emphasis omitted). Hence, Father is correct that ordinarily the 
maternal grandparents should have brought their request for custody and the 
evidence of abuse on which it was based to the Arizona court. [Emphasis 
added.] 
As can be seen from the foregoing, since Gerald has always resided in California and 
the California court retained jurisdiction to modify the Judgment and, has in fact, modified 
the Judgment several times (R. 209-214,305-310,715-720,547-548,721-722, and 723-724), 
the California court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support. 
Therefore, the decision of the trial court was proper in holding that the Fourth District Court 
lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear Marlene's pending Order to Show Cause since 
it is based on a void judgment, void because the Utah court purporting to modify the 
Judgment lacked the jurisdiction to do so. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT SINCE THE UTAH COURT LACKED THE 
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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE 
CALIFORNIA JUDGMENT, NO ACTIONS OF GERALD 
HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE LACK OF 
JURISDICTION 
Crump, supra, at pp. 1173 and 1174, discussed at length the issue of jurisdiction. In 
so doing, it stated: 
. . . . If a court lacks jurisdiction 'it has not power to entertain the suit/ Curtis 
v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (Citation omitted). Not only 
can a court not entertain the suit, the parties cannot cure the jurisdictional 
defect by a waiver or consent. Mrs. Crump's argument, and the dissent's 
assertion that because 'Mr.. Crump voluntarily and affirmatively engaged the 
Utah courts ... he waived any question regarding the authority of the Utah 
courts to decide the issue ... and has thus waived any objection to the district 
court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction,' it is without merit. We held that 
while defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived, subject matter 
jurisdiction goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action. A lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. 
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when 
subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can 
do any thing to fill that void. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The issue of waiver has been 
addressed by this court, see id., by our supreme court, and by the federal 
courts of appeal. See, e.g., McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1484-85 
(11th Cir.); cert, denied by Jenson v. McDougald, 479 U.S. 860, 93 L. Ed.2d 
13, 107 S.Ct. 207 (1986) [No waiver of jurisdictional defect in modification 
of child custody case even where father had consented to jurisdiction of 
Washington court, which court did not have jurisdiction]; A.J. Mackay Co. v. 
OklandConstr. Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 323,325 (Utah 1991) ['Acquiescence of the 
parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court, and a lack of 
jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any time.']; see also 
Annotation, Child Custody: When Does State That Issued Previous Custody 
Determination Have Continuing Jurisdiction Under Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Or Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). 
28 USCS § 1738A, 83 ALR 4th 742, 748 (1991) hereinafter Annotation 
(Citation omitted) ['Subject matter jurisdiction under the relevant child custody 
statutes cannot be vested by agreement of the parties, even though all of the 
parties desire an adjudication on the merits, and such jurisdiction cannot be 
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conferred on the court by a party's failure to interpose a timely objection to the 
court's assumption of jurisdiction.']. 
The Crump court went on to hold that "[ujnlike the UCCJA, the PKPA 'anchors 
exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original home 
state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains in that state."' [Emphasis in 
original.] The court further stated that a state "must decline to exercise that jurisdiction 
unless 'the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise 
such jurisdiction to modify such determination." [Emphasis in original.] In the instant case, 
California has definitely demonstrated it has not declined to exercise jurisdiction. The 
modification orders set forth in the Statement of Facts demonstrates this. (R. 209-214, 305-
310, 715-720 [August 24, 1987 order], 547-548 [November 16, 1994], 721-722 [March 3, 
1989], and 723-724 [May 5, 1993]. 
In accord, Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, 29 P.3d 13, 16 ["Lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. A lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction can be raised at anytime and when subject matter jurisdiction does not 
exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill that void." The Utah (the decree 
state) continuing jurisdiction issue of this case pivoted on whether the Father was still a 
resident of the State of Utah. If he were, then the Utah court had continuing exclusive 
jurisdiction. If not, then California did.] California in the present case is the decree state. 
Since Gerald continues to reside there, California has continuing jurisdiction. 
As stated hereinabove, the Crump court went on to hold that because the husband 
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resided in Montana, the state that issued the original decree of divorce, the Utah court was 
without jurisdiction to modify that Montana support decree. Gerald has always resided in 
California. Therefore, the decision of the trial court to grant his Motion to Strike based upon 
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper. 
The June 30, 1980 stipulation of Gerald purporting to modify the Judgment in Utah 
did not confer jurisdiction on the Fourth District Court. (R. 62.) The question of jurisdiction 
can be raised at any time by either the court or a party. Based upon the foregoing, clearly 
the trial court's conclusion was correct - that the Fourth District Court was without 
jurisdiction to hear the Order to Show Cause or to give any regard to any past Utah court 
orders upon which it was based. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT 
("UIFSA") APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 
The Utah Legislature passed the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") 
during 1996. See § 78-45f-100, History. 
Even though not controlling, the case of Child Support Enforcement Division of 
Alaska v. Brenckle, 675 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Mass. 1997) is instructive on this issue: 
UIFSA aims to cure the problem of conflicting support orders entered by 
multiple courts and provides for the exercise of continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction by one tribunal over support orders Under UIFSA, once one 
court enters a support order, no other court may modify that order for so long 
as the obligee, obligor, or child for whose benefit the order is entered 
continues to reside within the jurisdiction of that court unless each party 
consents in writing to another jurisdiction. 
Also, 
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This is consistent with the fundamental purpose of UIFSA: to 'create a uniform 
basis for jurisdiction so that. . . only one support order is in effect at any one 
time,' and to ' limit the number of tribunals having jurisdiction to modify a 
child support order. 
It was the express intention of the Legislature that UIFSA be applied 
retrospectively; its provisions govern any URESA action that is fpending or 
was previously adjudicated' It is also clear that UIFSA, like its predecessor 
URESA, does not create a duty of support, but rather provides the procedural 
framework for enforcing one State's support order in another jurisdiction. . . 
. It is proper that UIFSA should be applied retroactively. [Emphasis added.] 
Brenckle, supra, at p. 393. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's decision granting Gerald's Motion to Strike Marlene's Order to Show 
Cause should be affirmed. The Utah case law appears to be unanimous that as long as 
Gerald continues to reside in California and the California courts continue to exercise 
jurisdiction, this state cannot modify a California Judgment. Additionally, a Judgment 
brought to this state for enforcement purposes only cannot be subsequently modified. Any 
subsequent modification is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
This Court should award sanctions, attorney fees and costs to Gerald as a result of 
Marlene's non-compliant Notice of Appeal, Docketing Statement, briefs, and attempting to 
supplement the record without consent of the trial court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26* day of April, 2004. 
David Drake 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
Gerald D. Lundahl 
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